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In light of modern technological advance-
ments, courts across the country are faced with a
unique challenge that will have far-reaching
ramifications.' The challenge comes from the
realm known as "cyberspace." 2 The issue to be ad-
dressed is inherently difficult given the distinct
nature of cyberspace and the Internet, the me-
dium through which it is accessed. 3 Users of the
Internet benefit from the medium's ability to
reach large audiences. 4 However, this benefit
gives rise to one of the most legally troubling fea-
tures of cyberspace, which is the ability of com-
puter users to transcend physical borders without
ever leaving their homes or places of business.
5
Computer users who interact in cyberspace are
not likely to be aware of the implications of being
I See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Pub., Inc.,
939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039-1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that
declaration of personal jurisdiction over providers on the
World Wide Web could have a "devastating impact" on those
who use the service).
2 See Richard S. Zembek, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fun-
damental Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J.
Sci. & TECH. 339 (1996). The term "cyberspace" was origi-
nally used by William Gibson to describe "the consensual hal-
lucination that has many aspects of physical space, but is
merely computer-generated abstract data." Id. at 343 n.12
(citations omitted); see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
871 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The Internet is "a decentralized, global
medium of communications-or, 'cyber space'-that links
people, institutions, corporations and governments around
the world . . . These communications can occur almost in-
stantaneously, and can be directed either to specific individu-
als, to a broader group of people interested in a particular
subject, or to the world as a whole." Id. See also Lawrence H.
Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the
Electronic Frontier, THE HUMANIST, Mar. 26, 1991, at 15. Cyber-
space is a place "without physical walls or even physical
dimensions" in which interaction occurs as if it happened in
the real world and in real time. Id.
3 See Zembek, supra note 2, at 343 (noting that users sign
onto the Internet and surf through cyberspace). See also Digi-
tal Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc., 960 F. Supp.
456, 478 (D. Mass. 1997) (defines "surfing" as "moving
quickly from Web-page to Web-page").
4 Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL
97097, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997), quoting ACLU, 929 F.
in a borderless, technological forum.6 In effect,
they lack the requisite notice of which laws and
customs may govern their activity in cyberspace.
As with all media of communication, cyber-
space may be the site for violations of personal
and commercial rights. The pertinent issue con-
cerns thejudiciary's assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion over non-domiciliary defendants who interact
with other computer users over the Internet.
Courts must decide whether to address these vio-
lations under the traditional doctrines of personal
jurisdiction7 or to create a virtual body of law" to
deal with infractions that occur in a "fictional"
place. 9 Many courts have chosen the former over
the latter, and in doing so, have arrived at incon-
Supp. at 844. "Once a provider posts content on the In-
ternet, it is available to all other Internet users world-
wide... Once a provider posts its content on the Internet, it
cannot prevent that content from entering any commu-
nity ... Internet technology gives a speaker a potential world-
wide audience." Id.
5 See id. (suggesting that internet surfers are not aware
that they have legally traveled outside their home).
6 See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc.,
960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997). "Physical boundaries typi-
cally have framed legal boundaries, in effect creating sign-
posts that warn that we will be required after crossing to
abide by different rules." Id. at 463. See also David R. Johnson
& David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996). "In cyberspace, physical bor-
ders no longer function as signposts informing individuals of
the obligations assumed by entering into a new, legally signif-
icant, place." Id. at 1375.
7 See generally Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126
F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).,
8 SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 6, at 1375 (suggesting
the need for creation of clear legal rules for the entirely new
phenomena known as cyberspace); William S. Byassee, Juris-
diction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual
Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 197 (1995) (advocating
legislative action rather than judicial distortion of existing
statutes for cyberspace communities).
9 See Zembek, supra note 2, at 345. Legal disputes re-
quire a court to either develop a new body ofjurisprudence
or select analogous legal precedents and fictions to analyze
the emerging cyber-action. Id.
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sistent and sometimes contradictory results."'
The traditional test for determining whether a
court has personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant requires consideration of the forum
state's long-arm statute" and the constitutional
requirements of due process. 12 In particular,
courts must evaluate whether the activity in cyber-
space is purposefully directed towards the forum
state such that the assertion of jurisdiction would
not violate a defendant's due process rights. All
states have enacted long-arm statutes which en-
able a court to exercise its jurisdiction out of the
forum state and to bring a nonresident defendant
into the state to defend a lawsuit. '3 A number of
long-arm statutes provide for the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defend-
ant, or a representative of a non-domiciliary de-
fendant, who transacts any business within the
state or commits a tortious act within the state.'
4
Application of a long-arm statute usually involves
consideration of whether or not the non-domicili-
ary regularly conducts or solicits business in the
forum state and whether or not substantial reve-
nues are generated through such interaction.'
5
'0 See CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257,1260
(6th Cir. 1996) (holding that Ohio court could properly ex-
ercise personal jurisdiction over Texas resident based on use
of Internet database); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96
Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997)
(holding that defendant from New Jersey is not subject to
jurisdiction of New York courts based on Internet web site);
Digital Equip., 960 F. Supp. at 466 (holding that Massachu-
setts' court could exercise jurisdiction over California de-
fendant for alleged trademark infringement involving the In-
ternet); Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328
(E.D. Mo. 1996) (finding that California user was properly
subject to jurisdiction in Missouri based on Internet activity);
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that Missouri defendant is not sub-
ject to exercise ofjurisdiction by New York court based on its
web site), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d. Cir. 1997); and Inset Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn.
1996) (holding that Connecticut court could exercise juris-
diction over Massachusetts defendant as a result of trade-
mark dispute on the Internet).
I I SeeJAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE § 108.6011] (3d ed. 1997). Defines "long-arm statute"
as "statutory limits on the exercise of jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants." Id.
12 See Maritz, Inc., 947 F. Supp. at 1329.
1 - See Moore et al., supra note 11, § 108.60[1].
14 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411(c) (West 1958)
(Connecticut long-arm statute); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch.223A, 3 (West 1985) (Massachusetts's long-arm statute),
Mo. ANN. STAT. 506.500 (West 1952) (Missouri's long-arm
statute); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2307.382(A) (Anderson
1995) (Ohio's long-arm statute).
'5 See Bensusan Rest., 937 F. Supp. at 299; Digital Equip.,
Courts that have applied long-arm statutes have
broadly interpreted such statutes to enhance their
powers and permit the exercise of their jurisdic-
tion. 16
The second requirement for the proper exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction is that it be consistent
with the notions of due process as provided in the
Constitution of the United States.1 7 Due process
requires a non-domiciliary defendant to have suf-
ficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state
such that he/she could reasonably anticipate be-
ing haled into court there.' 8 Although courts vary
in their approaches, satisfaction of the minimum
contacts requirement usually involves an analysis
of the quality and nature of the defendant's con-
tacts with the state seeking to invoke its jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.1 9 General jurisdiction is
evidenced by "continuous, systematic and substan-
tial" contacts between the defendant and the fo-
rum state. 20 To hold that sufficient minimum con-
tacts exist, a court must find that the nonresident
defendant purposefully availed himself to the fo-
rum state and that the exercise of jurisdiction is
reasonable. 2' By contrast, specific jurisdiction ex-
960 F. Supp at 464.
16 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1122 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (noting that even if con-
duct did not violate a specific provision of the long-arm stat-
ute, the court was authorized to exercise its jurisdiction to
the "fullest extent" allowed under the Constitution); Maritz,
947 F. Supp. at 1331 (reasoning that although infringing ac-
tivities occurred "wholly" outside the forum state, the long-
arm statute could be properly invoked because the activities
had produced an effect in the state).
17 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 315 (1945). Courts must consider whether the state can
exact the desired remedy consistently with the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
18 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297-98 (1980) (holding that an Oklahoma court does
not have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile
retailer and its distributor when the defendant's only connec-
tion with the forum state was the fact that an automobile sold
in New York to New York residents became involved in an
accident in Oklahoma).
19 See Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816
(8th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Circuit has set forth a five-part
test for measuring minimum contacts: (1) the nature and
quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity
of those contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to
the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing
a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience of the par-
ties. See id. at 819 (citing Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furni-
ture Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1983)).
20 JAMES WM. MOORE ET. AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 108.41 [1] (3d ed. 1997) (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446-447 (1952)).
21 Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23
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ists if the claim results specifically from the de-
fendant's contacts with the forum state. 22 Regard-
less of the distinction, courts must ensure
compliance with "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."
23
Jurisdictional issues involving the use of the In-
ternet create a more difficult problem. As previ-
ously suggested, in most instances computer users
are unaware that they have transcended physical
borders and are subject to the jurisdiction of any
state in which their message is received. 24 Hence,
application of a state's long-arm statute to In-
ternet users may not comply with the notion of
due process since a user cannot purposefully avail
himself of a particular jurisdiction if he has no in-
dication where he is in cyberspace. The confu-
sion which Internet users experience is exacer-
bated by the different approaches of district
courts to the issue of personal jurisdiction. 25 This
inconsistency has continued at the appellate
level.26 In this technological era, the courts need
to develop a consistent approach for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction in causes of action involv-
ing the Internet, while simultaneously adhering to
the traditional standards of due process.
This Note begins with a brief explanation of the
Internet and how personal jurisdiction issues
arise. Part II focuses on the early cases involving
interactions in cyberspace, and the initial findings
by some courts that their exercise of jurisdiction
would be inappropriate. Part III examines how
F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). The courts have established a
three-part test for minimum contacts to determine whether
jurisdiction may be exercised: (1) the defendant must pur-
posefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum
state or causing a consequence in the forum state. (2) the
cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities [in
the forum state]. (3) the acts of the defendant or conse-
quences caused by the defendant must have a substantial
enough connection with the forum to make the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. See id. at 1116
(citation omitted).
22 SeeJAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE § 108.42[1] (3d ed. 1997). Claims must arise from or be
related to defendant's activities within the state. See id.
23 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945). See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 478 (1985). The Supreme Court identified the follow-
ing factors to consider when evaluating fairness: (1) the bur-
den on the defendant; (2) the forum state's interest in adju-
dicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenience and effective relief, (4) the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several States
in furthering fundamental substantive policies. See id. (citing
courts overcame their resistance and began to
take a more assertive approach towards the exer-
cise of their jurisdiction. Part III concludes with
examples of how the courts began to develop
standards and to properly limit their jurisdiction
to those instances in which it is most reasonable.
Part IV addresses the future of personal jurisdic-
tion over users of the Internet. The Note con-
cludes by suggesting the adoption of a flexible
standard that is consistent with the traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice required
by the Due Process clause.
I. THE INTERNET AND INTERACTIONS IN
CYBERSPACE.
The Internet is a global communications net-
work linked principally by modems which trans-
mit electronic data over telephone lines. 27 Physi-
cal access to the Internet is established through
use of a computer that is directly connected to a
computer network (which is itself connected to
the Internet) or use of a personal computer with a
modem.28 When Internet users interact in cyber-
space, their behavior is likely to give rise to typical
legal disputes, such as those involving "promo-
tional sales, breaches of contract, and tortious
conduct. '29 Consequently, there is a question of
authority to determine which state court has per-
sonal jurisdiction over the actors involved.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980)).
24 See Johnson & Post, supra note 6, at 1371. "The Net
enables transactions between people who do not know, and
in many cases cannot know, each other's physical location."
Id.
25 See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328
(E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,
937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). But see Hearst Corp. v.
Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
26, 1997); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp.
295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
26 See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th
Cir. 1996). But see Bensusan, 126 F.3d 25.
27 See Inset Systens, 937 F. Supp. at 163.
28 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
29 Zembek, supra note 2, at 345-346. "As would be ex-
pected, cyber-relationships give rise to legal disputes... One
quickly realizes that the actors and activities are real upon
examining the underlying facts of typical cyber-actions-pro-
motional sales, breaches of contract, and tortious conduct."
(The author gives examples of each of these situations). Id.
19981
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II. THE INITIAL RESISTANCE TO EXTEND
JURISDICTION
Initially, courts were hesitant to expand their
power into the vast world of cyberspace, and
therefore, tended to conclude that the exercise of
jurisdiction with respect to Internet users would
be unreasonable. For instance, when the federal
district court in Ohio first grappled with the issue
of jurisdiction in CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,""1
the court determined that enabling the user's
contacts with the forum to subject the user to per-
sonal jurisdiction in the forum where the service
provider is located would be "manifestly unrea-
sonable." 3' The issue arose as the result of a dis-
pute between a Houston, Texas resident, Richard
Patterson, who entered into software agreements
with CompuServe, which was then located in Co-
lumbus, Ohio, via his computer.3 2 CompuServe
provided Internet access on its network to sub-
scribers who entered the system through their
own hardware and telephone line.3 3 The agree-
ments provided a means by which Patterson could
distribute his software programs to other Internet
users. 34 Patterson eventually became disgruntled
when CompuServe began to market its own com-
parable program, and a dispute alleging trade-
mark infringement ensued. 3 5 CompuServe
brought a declaratory judgment action in Ohio's
30 See generally CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, No. C2-94-
91, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20352 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 11, 1994),
rev'd 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant's
links were "too tenuous" to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction, and therefore, granting defendant's motion to
dismiss).
31 Id. at *20-21. (noting that this issue does not differ
from the standard out of state customer dispute and that any
court would have a difficult time concluding the exercise of
personal jurisdiction was proper).
342 See id. at *4.
13 See id. at *2.
"34 Id. Patterson and CompuServe entered into a user
Agreement which provided that: "The CompuServe informa-
tion service . . .consists of computing and information ser-
vice and software, information and other content provided
by CompuServe Incorporated ("CompuServe"). In addition,
third parties provide information, software, and other con-
tent ... which may be accessed over the Service." Id.
'5 CompuServe, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20352 at *3. "This
lawsuit arises out of certain software which Patterson claims
to have developed, and which is entitled "WinNav," "Win-
dows Navigator," and "FlashPoint Windows Navigator." Id.
Sometime in late 1993, CompuServe announced to its users
that it had developed, and would soon be releasing, a Win-
dows version of a program to be entitled "CompuServe Navi-
gator." Id. As a result of this announcement, Patterson ad-
vised CompuServe of his claim to a common law trademark
Southern District, and Patterson subsequently
moved to dismiss the complaint based on lack of
personal jurisdiction.
36
In support of Ohio's jurisdiction, CompuServe
argued that the Agreement was made and per-
formed in Ohio, the product's locus was in its
server in Columbus, Ohio, and that Patterson had
sufficient contacts with the forum state.3 7 Despite
CompuServe's assertions, the court noted that the
nature of Patterson's contacts with Ohio residents
was not sufficient enough to establish that Patter-
son had purposefully availed himself to the laws of
the state.3 1 In doing so, the court reiterated that
physical entry into the state was not necessary to
the assessment of whether the nonresident pur-
posefully availed himself.3 9 The court further
ruled that Ohio courts lacked jurisdiction since
Patterson's contacts did not even give rise to the
cause of action.40 Finally, in holding that Patter-
son's contacts with Ohio were too tenuous to es-
tablish jurisdiction, the court acknowledged that
to hold otherwise would simply be unfair.
4 1
Another instance where a court was hesitant to
conclude that it had jurisdiction over a conflict
arising out of dealings involving computer net-
works was Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access,
InC. 42 In Pres-Kap, the non-domiciliary defendant
was a business owned and operated in New York.
43
in the names "WinNav," "Windows Navigator," and
"FlashPoint Windows Navigator," and suggested that if Com-
puServe released its software, it would be violating his trade-
mark rights." Id.
"-, See id. at *3-4.
"47 See id.
• 8 CompuServe, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20352 at *16-17
(characterizing the relationship as a "minimal course of deal-
ing" since an independent, ongoing relationship was not
contemplated).
M) See id. at *11. Although physical entry into the forum
state is not necessary in order for the Court to find that a
defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting business there, there is a requirement that the
connection between the defendant's activities and the forum
state be more than incidental before jurisdiction can consti-
tutionally be exercised. See id. (citation omitted).
40 See id. at *18 (noting that CompuServe relied on de-
fendant's status as a CompuServe user, when in fact, the use
of the network is incidental to the trademark dispute be-
tween the parties).
41 See id. at *20-21. It would be manifestly unreasonable
for this or any Ohio court to exercise jurisdiction over this
case. Id.
,"2 See generally Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Ac-
cess, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994).
4-1 See id. at 1352.
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Pres-Kap, the plaintiff, was headquartered in
Miami, Florida, but maintained a branch office in
New York.44 The defendant contracted with rep-
resentatives of Pres-Kap in its New York offices to
lease computer terminals which accessed the
main computer base in Miami. 45 The defendant
company made its monthly payments to the bill-
ing office in Miami. 46 Despite the facts that the
payments were made to the Miami office and the
computer database accessed by the defendant was
located in Miami, the state trial court in Florida
found that there were not sufficient minimum
contacts for System One, Direct Access to expect
to have to defend against suit in Florida.4
7
In its analysis, the Florida court suggested that
the nature of "on-line" computer services is such
that to bring suit at the site of the central database
would be inefficient.48 The court also noted the
recent flourish in contractual arrangements en-
tered into on-line, and the unreasonableness of
subjecting users to the jurisdiction of the
database's location.49 Of particular importance
was the potential detriment to commercial trans-
actions and research efforts that are conducted
on-line.50 For example, the costs of defending
against litigation in numerous states may make
the operation of a web site more expensive. 5'
Similarly, access to the Internet is indispensable to
the research efforts of educational institutions
and manufacturers.
52
44 See id. at 1351.
45 See id. at 1352.
46 See id.
47 See id. at 1353. "It is settled law that an individual's
contract with an out-of-state party alone can[not] automati-
cally establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other
party's home forum to support an assertion of in personam
jurisdiction against the out-of-state defendant." Pres-Kap, 636
So. 2d at 1353 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 478 (1985)).
48 See supra, note 42 and accompanying text. "The addi-
tional factor in this case that the computer database for the
contracted-for information happens to be located in Florida
cannot change this result." Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1353.
49 See Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1353. The court expressed
dismay that users of such "on-line" services could be haled
into court in the state in which a supplier's billing office and
database happen to be located. Id.
50 See id. "Across the nation, in every state, customers of
"on-line" computer information networks have contractual
arrangements with out-of-state supplier compa-
nies ... Lawyers, journalists, teachers, physicians, courts, uni-
versities, and business people throughout the country daily
conduct various types of computer-assisted research over tele-
III. THE RECOGNITION THAT
JURISDICTION EXISTS: THE
TRANSITION FROM AN ASSERTIVE
APPROACH TO ADOPTION OF
REASONABLE STANDARDS.
Despite the initial resistance of the CompuServe
and Pres-Kap courts to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over Internet users, other courts began to ap-
proach the issue of jurisdiction differently as the
number of Internet controversies increased.
Some courts were not in awe of the technological
prowess of the Internet and dispelled with the no-
tion that the exercise of jurisdiction would be tan-
tamount to a claim of worldwide jurisdiction.
These courts realized that, inevitably, the exercise
ofjudicial power can provide Internet users with a
sense of security and enable users to take advan-
tage of the technological phenomenon. The fol-
lowing section outlines this approach.
A. Violations of Federal Statute
The first case of note is United States v. Thomas,
53
in which the defendant was found guilty of adver-
tising and displaying sexually explicit materials on
his electronic bulletin board.54 Among defend-
ant's arguments was his claim the exercise ofjuris-
diction was improper based on the fact that he
did not have knowledge of the transmissions of
phone lines linked to supplier databases located in other
states." See id.
51 See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc.,
960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997). Judge Gertner states "[I]t
is troubles [sic] me to force corporations that do business
over the Internet, precisely because it is cost-effective, to now
factor in the potential costs of defending against litigation in
each and every state; anticipating these costs could make the
maintenance of a Web-based business more expensive." Id.
at 471.
52 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
"Such access enables students and professors to use informa-
tion and content provided by the college or university itself,
and to use the vast amount of research resources and other
information available on the Internet worldwide." Id. at 832.
5- See generally United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th
Cir. 1996) (computer bulletin board operator was subject to
venue in forum where allegedly obscene material was re-
ceived despite allegedly intangible form of the materials).
54 See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 833. Defines electronic bul-
letin board as a dial-in computer service "where friends,




obscene materials at the time they occurred. 55
However, in this instance, the defendant was vio-
lating a federal statute which made it per se illegal
to transmit obscene material. 56 Accordingly, the
Sixth Circuit determined that jurisdiction was
proper in every judicial district from, through, or
into which the obscene material moved. 57
Although Thomas was significant because a federal
statute was involved, the holding at that time rep-
resented a clear shift towards more assertive exer-
cises of jurisdiction.
B. The Trademark Examples
Other examples of cases in which courts exer-
cised their personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants continued to emerge. For example,
in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. ,58 the
United States District Court in Connecticut deter-
mined that the Internet advertisements of a Mas-
sachusetts corporation which solicited business in
Connecticut were of a sufficient nature to invoke
the Connecticut long-arm statute.59 The court
also held that the Massachusetts corporation's ad-
vertisements were sufficient minimum contacts to
support the exercise of jurisdiction. 60  Inset,
which is located in Connecticut, developed and
marketed computer software on a global basis.
61
Instruction Set, which was located in Massachu-
setts, provided computer technology and support
to organizations throughout the world.62 Inset
55 See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709. Defendants argued that
government agent, without their knowledge, accessed and
downloaded the files at issue. See id.
56 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1465 (West 1995 Supp.) and Thomas,
74 F.3d at 709. "To establish a Section 1465 violation, the
Government must prove that a defendant knowingly used a
facility or means of interstate commerce for the purpose of
distributing obscene materials ... Section 1465 does not re-
quire the Government to prove that Defendants had specific
knowledge of the destination of each transmittal at the time
it occurred." Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709.
57 See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709.
58 Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp.
161 (D. Conn. 1996).
59 See id.
60 See id. at 164-65. "Solicitation of business" was found
to exist because defendant had repeatedly solicited business
within the forum state via its internet advertisement and the
availability of its toll-free number. Id.
61 See id. at 162.
62 See id.
63 Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 163.
64 Id.
65 Id.
registered the name "INSET" as its trademark.6 3
Meanwhile, Instruction obtained the name "IN-
SET.COM"' as its Internet domain address. 64 In-
set's main concern was that since the domain
name was identical to the trademark name, users
might inadvertently contact an unintended com-
pany and the result would be "confusion in the
marketplace.
65
The court reached its decision regarding the
applicability of the long-arm statute despite the
fact that the defendant did not have any employ-
ees or offices in Connecticut and the finding that
it did not conduct business in Connecticut on a
regular basis.6 6 The basis for the court's conclu-
sion was its reliance on a provision of the Con-
necticut long-arm statute which provides that an
out-of-state defendant will be subject to suit in the
state if a cause of action arises out of business
which has repeatedly been solicited in the state.
67
Solicitation of a sufficient repetitive nature was
found to exist based on the number of Internet
access sites in Connecticut. 6 Of particular impor-
tance was the observation that, unlike hard-copy
advertisements, Internet advertisements are not
easily disposed of and can be accessed repeatedly
by potential consumers.69 As a result, once the
contacts are initiated they are continually main-
tained.
In its minimum contacts analysis, the Inset court
focused on whether or not the defendant could
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in
If a company uses a domain which is identical to the
name or trademark of a company, an Internet user may
inadvertently access an unintended company. Thereaf-
ter, the Internet user may not realize that the advertise-
ment is actually from an unintended company, or the
Internet user may erroneously assume that the source of
information is the intended company. As a result, con-
fusion in the marketplace could develop.
Id.
66 See id. at 162-164.
67 See id. at 164. The Connecticut long-arm statute,
C.G.S. § 33-411 (c) (2) states that:
Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this
state, by a resident of this state ... on any cause of action
arising . . .(2) out of any business solicited in this
state . . . if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited
business, whether the orders or offers relating thereto
were accepted within or without the state .
Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 163.
68 See id. "[Defendant] has been continuously advertising
over the Internet, which includes at least 10,000 access sites
in Connecticut." Id.
69 See id. (noting that Internet advertisments are unique
because they are in electronic printed form).
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Connecticut. 70 The court found that the Massa-
chusetts corporation had purposefully availed it-
self of the privilege of doing business in Connecti-
cut, and therefore could reasonably anticipate
having to defend against a lawsuit there, primarily
because it had established a toll-free number in
conjunction with its Internet advertisements.
71
The implication of this conclusion is obvious;
such reasoning would subject the defendant to ju-
risdiction not only in Connecticut but potentially
in all fifty states. In Inset, the court also assumed
that the traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice would not be compromised if the
case were to be adjudicated in Connecticut be-
cause the distance between the forum state and
the defendant's home state was "minimal.
72
In Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.,73 a United
States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri likewise held that a forum state could
properly exercise jurisdiction over a defendant
who had advertised over the Internet.7 4 In this in-
stance, the non-domiciliary defendant operated
an Internet server in California, which allowed
users to sign onto a mailing list to receive adver-
tisements. 75 The site was not yet operational; it
merely promoted the upcoming service to be pro-
vided.7 6 The plaintiff, a corporation located in
Missouri, filed suit claiming trademark infringe-
ment and unfair competition. 77  In response,
CyberGold argued that the only alleged contact
with the state of Missouri resulted from the mere
fact that its web site was accessible to Missouri resi-
dents. 78  Furthermore, Cybergold argued, the
number of times Missouri residents had accessed
the site was only 311, and 180 of those times were
70 See id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). "[Due Process] limitations
require that a nonresident corporate defendant have 'mini-
mum contacts' with the forum state such that it would rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id.
71 See Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165.
72 See id.
73 See generally 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
74 See id.
75- See id. at 1330.
76 See id.
77 See id. at 1329. Maritz, Inc. asserts that CyberGold's
web site acts as a state-wide advertisement for CyberGold's
forthcoming service, and through the web site, CyberGold is
"actively soliciting" customers from Missouri. Id.
78 See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330.
79 See id.
80 See id. at 1331. "[T]he court concludes that Missouri's
long-arm statute reaches the defendants, even assuming
Cyberrold's allegedly infringing activities were wholly
by the plaintiff and its employees. 79 The court
reasoned that Missouri's long-arm statute was ap-
plicable because Maritz had suffered economic
harm and injury in the state of Missouri as a result
of the defendant's behavior.80
The court's evaluation of due process focused
on the quality and nature of CyberGold's con-
tacts. Although CyberGold sought to characterize
its web site as merely "passive," the district court
found otherwise.8' The court's conclusion that
CyberGold "consciously" decided to transmit its
advertisement appeared to satisfy the requirement
of purposeful availment.82 Yet, in the same
breath, the court acknowledged that CyberGold's
web site "automatically and indiscriminately" re-
sponded to each user who accessed the web site.85
The court offered no explanation as to how a de-
fendant can purposefully avail himself of the ben-
efits of a jurisdiction when he has no discretion
or control as to where the site will be accessed.
The only support is found in the court's sugges-
tion that since technology has made transactions
simpler and more feasible, the permissible scope
of jurisdiction exercisable by the courts must be
enhanced in order to keep pace.
8 4
C. Reversal of CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson
The view that a more expansive exercise of ju-
risdiction over Internet activity is necessary lead
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit to reverse the holding of CompuServe, Inc.
v. Patterson.85 In its opinion, the court held that
the non-domiciliary defendant had purposefully
availed himself of the benefits of doing business
outside of Missouri, because the allegedly infringing activities
have produced an effect in Missouri as they have allegedly
caused Maritz economic injury." Id.
81 Id. at 1333. "The website invites internet users to use
CyberGold's new service when it becomes operational. This
service and the promotional efforts that CyberGold is em-
ploying by posting the information on its website are alleg-
edly infringing on plaintiff's alleged trademark." Id.
82 Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330. "Through its website,
CyberGold had consciously decided to transmit advertising
information to all internet users, knowing that such informa-
tion will be transmitted globally." Id.
83 See id.
84 See id. at 1334 (quoting California Software Inc. v. Reli-
ability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1363 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (suggesting that the scope of courts should be broad-
ened in response to technological advancements)).
85 See generally CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257 (6th Cir. 1996), revg No. C2-94-91, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20352 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 11, 1994).
19981
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
in the forum state, that the cause of action arose
from the defendant's contacts with the forum
state, and that the subsequent exercise of jurisdic-
tion was reasonable. 6
In its approach, the Sixth Circuit Court focused
on whether Patterson's contacts with the state
where the computer network service was head-
quartered were "substantial. 8s 7 Of particular im-
portance was Patterson's written contract with
CompuServe which specified that the transactions
would be governed by Ohio law. 8 But the con-
tract alone was not the decisive factor. The
court's finding of minimum contacts was also
based on Patterson's injection of his software into
the stream of commerce.8 9 Beyond finding that
Patterson had "consciously" reached out from
Texas to Ohio to subscribe to CompuServe, 90 the
court emphasized that Patterson had "originated
and maintained" his contacts with CompuServe. 91
The court also determined that Ohio's exercise of
its jurisdiction was reasonable because, although
defending the suit in Ohio would be burdensome
to Patterson, he did voluntarily place his software
on CompuServe's Ohio-based system.92
D. Pulling Back the Reins- The Search for a
More Reasonable Approach
In the past year, the approaches to jurisdiction
implemented by courts have demonstrated more
reasoned analysis and greater consistency. The
United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York has been very successful in devel-
86 See id.
87 Id. at 1264.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 1265, citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) ("The placement of a prod-
uct into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act
of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
State.").
90 See id. at 1266. "Patterson consciously reached out
from Texas to Ohio to subscribe to CompuServe, and to use
its service to market his computer software on the Internet."
ConipuServe, 89 F.3d at 1266.
9 I Id. (focusing on defendant's repeated use of elec-
tronic and regular mail for messages to CompuServe and the
posting of a message on one of CompuServe's electronic fo-
rums).
92 See id. at 1267. Someone like Patterson who employs a
computer network service like CompuServe to market a
product can reasonably expect disputes with that service to
yield lawsuits in the service's home state. See id. at 1268.
93 Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997
oping a thoughtful, reasoned framework to deter-
mine the proper exercise of jurisdiction. Among
the district court's opinions setting forth a concise
analysis is Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger.93 In Hearst,
the court determined that New York courts lacked
jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant
whose Internet web site was merely accessible to
New York residents.94 The defendant in Hearst
was an attorney who lived in New Jersey and
worked as an associate at a law firm in Philadel-
phia.95 Goldberger developed a network, accessi-
ble by computer, to provide legal support services
to individual attorneys.'" At the time of the pro-
ceeding, the web site was not yet operational, but
merely consisted of a home page that briefly de-
scribed the services Goldberger planned to of-
fer.9 7 Hearst, which publishes the ESQUIRE mag-
azine, argued that Goldberger's domain name,
"ESQWIRE.COM", infringed on its trademark. 98
In its opinion, the Hearst court acknowledged
that the issue of personal jurisdiction based solely
on plaintiffs accessing a web site from their juris-
diction has split the federal district courts.99 The
court adopted the approach that resolution of the
issue must be made by analogy to existing, non-
Internet case law.' 00 The relevant portion of the
New York long-arm statute requires that the non-
domiciliary defendant transact business in the
state and the cause of action must arise out of
such a transaction for jurisdiction to lie in New
York. °0 While considering the nature and quality
of Goldberger's contacts, the court noted that the
web site at issue was not targeted at the residents
WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
94 See id. at *1 (finding that defendant has not contracted
to sell or actually sold any products or services to computer
users in the forum state).
95 See id. at *3.
961 See id. Goldberger came up with the idea to "create an
electronic law office infrastructure network that would pro-
vide individual attorneys, via computer, with legal support
services equivalent to those available to lawyers practicing in
large law firms." Id.
q7 See id. at *4.
98 Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *3. The complaint alleges
that Hearst's ESQUIRE and ESQ marks "have acquired tre-
mendous secondary meaning" and that those marks are "in-
herently distinctive, nonfunctional, strong and famous marks
entitled to a very broad scope of protection." See id.
99 See id. at *7.
100 See id.
1) See id. at *8 (quoting Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc., v.
Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1040, 1051 (S.D.N.Y.
1987)).
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of New York or any other particular state.' 0 2 The
court referred to previous instances which held
that advertisements directed towards the New
York market1 '0 3 and the use of an 800 number'0 4
were insufficient to satisfy the transaction of busi-
ness requirement. 0 5 Goldberger's contacts were
even less intrusive since he had not sold any prod-
ucts; the site was merely an announcement. The
court reasoned that since the web site was "analo-
gous to an advertisement in a national publica-
tion," it did not constitute sufficient contacts with
New York to provide the court with jurisdiction. 10 6
The court also rejected Hearst's argument that
Goldberger's contacts with New York residents by
e-mail were sufficient to establish jurisdiction. 10 7
In doing so, the court compared the transmittal
of e-mail messages to a resident in New York to
the act of sending a single letter or engaging in a
telephone conversation. 10  The Hearst opinion
also relied on the policy argument that allowing
interaction in cyberspace to establish sufficient
minimum contacts would be too broad an expan-
sion of personal jurisdiction. 10 9
The court in Hearst relied a great deal on Judge
Stein's opinion in a similar case, Bensusan Restau-
rant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). 11° In Bensusan Restaurant, the court con-
sidered an alleged trademark infringement claim
by the owner of a New York jazz club named the
Blue Note against the operator of a Missouri club
who operated a web site with the domain name,
102 See id. at *10.
103 See U.S. Mexican Dev. Corp. v. Condor, 91 Civ. 5925,
1992 WL 27179, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1992).
104 See Diskin v. Starck, 538 F. Supp. 877, 880 (E.D.N.Y.
1982).
105 See Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *10.
106 Id. at *12.
107 See id. at *13. "In short, neither Goldberger's ES-
QWIRE Internet web site, which is the equivalent of an adver-
tisement in a national publication, nor his e-mails, which are
equivalent to letters or telephone calls, are sufficient to pro-
vide this Court with personal jurisdiction over Goldberger
under CPLR § 302 (a)(1)." Id. (emphasis added).
108 See id. at *12. "Letters and telephone calls from
outside New York to people in New York are not sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1) or
the due process clause." Id. (citations omitted).
109 See Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *16. "Because the Web
enables easy world-wide access, allowing computer interac-
tion via the web to supply sufficient contacts to establish juris-
diction would eviscerate the personal jurisdiction require-
ment as it currently exists." Id. (citing McDonough v. Fallon
McElligott, Inc., No.95-4037, slip op. (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6,
1996)).
110 See id. at *15-16.
"The Blue Note."' The district court's opinion
holding that the assertion of jurisdiction violated
due process was recently affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 112
The issue focused on whether the creation of a
web site accompanied by a telephone number to
order the advertised product was an offer to sell
directed to the forum state.' '3 In denying the as-
sertion of jurisdiction, the court focused on the
fact that it takes several affirmative steps by the
New York residents to obtain access to the web site
and to use the information there. 1 4 Further-
more, "the mere fact that a person can gain infor-
mation on the allegedly infringing product is not
the equivalent of a person advertising, promoting,
selling or otherwise making an effort to target its
product in New York." 1 5 While focusing on the
quality and nature of the defendant's contacts,
the court concluded that the mere creation of the
web site does not constitute sufficient minimum
contacts.' 16
The appellate court acknowledged that flexible
application of the traditional standards for per-
sonal jurisdiction was necessary to establish prece-
dent with regard to the Internet. 17 The court
strictly construed New York's long-arm statute to
require that the non-domiciliary defendant or his
agent must commit a tortious act in New York for
jurisdiction to apply."" The court further de-
clared that mere injury in New York would not
suffice.' 19 With regard to foreseeability, the court
111 Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
112 See generally Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, No.
1383, Docket 96-9344, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10,
1997).
" See Bensusan, 937 F.Supp. at 295.
114 See id.
115 Id.
116 See id. at 301. "Creating a site, like placing a product
into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide-or
even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act purpose-
fully directed toward the forum state." Id. (citing Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1992)).
117 See Bensusan Restaurant, 1997 WL 560048, at *2.
"Although we realize that attempting to apply established
trademark law in the fast-developing world of the internet is
somewhat like trying to board a moving bus, we believe that
well-established doctrines of personal jurisdiction law sup-
port the result reached by the district court." Id.
11s Id. at *4 (concluding that plaintiff failed to allege
that defendant or his agent committed a tortious act in New
York).
119 Id. "Even if Bensusan suffered injury in New York,
that does not establish a tortious act in the state of New York
within the meaning of § 302 (a) (2)." Id.
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reasoned that King did not derive substantial reve-
nues from the interstate commerce, and that the
business operation was essentially of a "local char-
acter." 120
IV. THE FUTURE OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE
As alluded to earlier, one of the most difficult
issues posed by cyberspace is determination of the
applicable laws and customs. The fact that online
users are "real" people engaging in "real" transac-
tions draws the obvious conclusion that tradi-
tional legal doctrines for personal jurisdiction are
applicable. 121 Even those who argue that tradi-
tional legal paradigms should not apply to cyber-
space communities acknowledge that interactions
in cyberspace have effects in real world jurisdic-
tions.' 22 Consequently, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri was mis-
taken when it determined that analogies to ex-
isting legal notions were not sufficient. 1 23 The
District Court for the Southern District of New
York properly recognized in Hearst that the more
reasonable approach is to analogize cyberspaceju-
risdictional issues with traditional case law. 124 In
following this approach, the courts will be able to
maintain consistent standards and avoid punish-
ing the Internet for its utility.'
25
Consider, for example, the striking similarities
120 See id.
121 See Zembek, supra note 2, at 346. "Some commenta-
tors clearly believe a new body ofjurisprudence is required to
address the emerging cyber-action. The commentators go so
far as to argue that both electronic communities and entities,
so called "virtual communities" and "e-persons," have bred
from the free flow of information and compilation of cyber-
relationships. Id. The basic premise underlying these un-
precedented communities and persons is that cyberspace is a
world unto itself, and because cyberspace is a fictional world,
it can have only fictional actions and places. See id. There is
no need to waste time with these unnecessary, albeit creative,
fictional legal models. See id. Traditional legal notions do fit
complex cyberspace questions once one realizes that both
the actors and activities are real." Id. (citations omitted).
122 See Byassee, supra note 8, at 199. "The interactions
between users in cyberspace have effects in real world juris-
dictions, and the inhabitants of cyberspace are also citizens
of a physical jurisdiction." Id.
123 See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328,
1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996). "Because the internet is an entirely
new means of information exchange, analogies to cases in-
volving the use of mail and telephone are less than satisfac-
tory in determining whether the defendant has "purposefully
availed" itself to this forum." Id.
124 See Hearst Corporation v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ.
between the facts of Maritz and Hearst. Both in-
stances involved a web site which was not yet oper-
ational and provided a telephone number for fur-
ther information. 126 The court in Maritz decided
that CyberGold's decision to transmit its advertise-
ment in cyberspace, coupled with the knowledge
that it will be transmitted globally, was enough to
establish "purposeful availment."127 However, by
comparing advertisements in cyberspace to the
traditional realm of advertising in a publication,
the Hearst opinion suggests that the scope of an
advertisement is usually not critical to the deter-
mination ofjurisdiction. 28 Furthermore, the web
sites at issue in both Maritz and Hearst merely ad-
vertised services to be provided in the future and
allowed Internet users to sign-up to receive the
services. 29 Such activity can hardly be character-
ized as "solicitation" of such a nature so as to con-
stitute the transaction of business.
While the differences in opinions might be
most recognizable in the decisions regarding ad-
vertising on the Internet, the proper analysis for
whether personal jurisdiction exists is best exem-
plified by comparing the advertising cases to a
case involving contractual relations. Close exami-
nation of the nature of contacts reveals a critical
distinction. For instance, the court in Maritz re-
jected CyberGold's claim that it merely main-
tained a "passive" web site.' 30 The court's ruling
that the mere transmission of advertising informa-
3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997). "Unless
and until Congress or the New York legislature enacts In-
ternet specific jurisdictional legislation, however, the Court
must employ New York's existing jurisdictional statutes,
CPLR § 301 and 302, and analogize to presently existing,
traditional, non-Internet personal jurisdiction case law." Id.
125 See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1332. "Unlike the use of
the mail, the internet, with its electronic mail, is a tremen-
dously more efficient, quicker, and vast means of reaching a
global audience." Id.
126 See id. at 1328; Hearst Corp., 1997 WL 97097.
127 See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333. "Through its web
site, CyberGold has consciously decided to transmit advertis-
ing information to all internet users, knowing that such infor-
mation will be transmitted globally." Id.
128 See Hearst Corp., 1997 WL 97097 at *10 (noting that
under New York law, advertisements in national publications
are not sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction under the
relevant long-arm statute).
129 See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333 (noting that the web
sites "invites" internet users to use the service when it be-
comes operational); and Hearst, 1997 WL 97097 at *4
(describing web site consisting of brief description of services
non-domiciliary plans to offer).
130 Id.
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tion is contact of a sufficient nature to warrant ju-
risdiction is illogical in the modern era of com-
puterization.13 1 The court ignores that one of the
features of the Internet is the global availability of
information at the time it is posted in cyber-
space. 132 The court in Bensusan was faced with
similar facts, but there the court held that the na-
ture of the advertisement on the Internet was pas-
sive since it required "affirmative steps" by the
residents of the forum state.
133
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson marks a departure
from previous cases concerning advertising.'
34
The activity in CompuServe can accurately be de-
scribed as active, since the non-domiciliary de-
fendant entered into contractual agreements with
the plaintiff in the forum state and repeatedly
sent his software to the servers there.' 35 The dis-
tinguishing feature in CompuServe is the fact that
the defendant sought out the Ohio server and en-
gaged in a contract to be governed by Ohio
law. 136 Justification of the decision in CompuServe
lies in the court's reasonable interpretation of the
term "transaction of business." In particular, the
analysis is whether the non-domiciliary contracted
for the sale of goods, transmitted the goods, or,
engaged in correspondence of a nature more in-
131 See Maritz, 247 F.Supp. at 1333. "Thus, CyberGold's
contacts are of such a quality and nature, albeit a very new
quality and nature for personal jurisdiction jurisprudence,
that they favor the exercise of personal jurisdiction over de-
fendant." Id.
132 See David L. Stott, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace:
The Constitutional Boundary of Minimum Contacts Limited to a
Web Site, 15J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 819 (1997).
'Additional activity beyond a product entering a forum
through the stream of commerce is an important require-
ment for the minimum contacts analysis because of the very
nature of the Internet. By nature, once information is posted
on the Internet, that information is instantly in the stream of
commerce on a world-wide basis." Id. at 840.
133 Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295,
299 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). It takes several affirmative steps by the
New York resident, however, to obtain access to the Web site
and utilize the information there. See id. See also ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996). "Although con-
tent on the Internet is just a few clicks of a mouse away from
the user, the receipt of information on the Internet requires
a series of affirmative steps more deliberate than merely turn-
ing a dial." Id.
134 See generally CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
135 Id. at 1264. See also, Stott, supra note 132, at 839-840.
"Thus, Patterson's shareware contract with CompuServe was
the additional action required to meet the purposeful avail-
ment requirement for minimum contacts." Id.
trusive than a single telephone call or a letter via
mail.
Analysis of the second requirement for per-
sonal jurisdiction, that is, compliance with the
provisions of due process, is simplified if a more
objective standard of transacting business is
adopted. The most obvious provision is whether
the non-domiciliary could reasonably anticipate
being haled into the court of a given jurisdic-
tion.137 As previously suggested, cyberspace is all-
encompassing and, therefore, makes it difficult
for users to know with whom or where they are
interacting. 3" At least one court has determined
that the exercise of jurisdiction is proper only
when the nonresident expects or "should reason-
ably expect the tortious act to have consequences
in the state.' 13 9 Adoption of a clearer meaning of
the term "transaction of business" would elimi-
nate the subjectiveness of this evaluation.
Furthermore, it has been acknowledged that a
finding of jurisdiction based soley on mainte-
nance of a web site would mean there would be
worldwide jurisdiction over anyone who estab-
lishes a web site. 140 Courts have held that merely
placing an item into the "stream of commerce" is
sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction
136 See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1260. "Both the SRA
(Shareware Registration Agreement) and the Service Agree-
ment expressly provide that they are entered into in Ohio,
and the Service Agreement further provides that it is to "be
governed by and construed in accordance with" Ohio law."
Id.
137 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980).
138 See Stott, supra note 132, at 826. "[T]he nature of
cyberspace allows Internet users to access a Web site without
any awareness of the jurisdiction in which the Web site re-
sides." Id. See also Johnson & Post, supra note 6, at 1371.
"The Net enables transactions between people who do not
know, and in many cases cannot know, each other's physical
location." Id.
139 Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, No. 96-9344,
1997 WL 560048, at *4 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
140 See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Pub.,
Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039-1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
[Defendant] cannot be prohibited from operating its In-
ternet site merely because the site is accessible from
within one country in which its product is banned. To
hold otherwise would be tantamount to a declaration
that this Court, and every other court throughout the
world, may assert jurisdiction over all information prov-
iders on the global World Wide Web.
Id. (citations omitted). See alsoJohnson & Post, supra note 6,
at 1375 (arguing that territorial regulation of online activities
serves neither the legitimacy nor the notice justifications).
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under the Due Process Clause.' 41 In accordance
with this overly expansive approach, it is argued
that in cyberspace, the creation of a web site is
equivalent to the placing of a product into the
stream of commerce. 42 However, the creation of
a web site alone does not constitute a requisite
physical act, and consequently, there is no such
placement into the stream of commerce.1 43 Like-
wise, the view that awareness that a product is
marketed in a forum eliminates any unfairness
and is sufficient to warrant the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion 4 4 is inappropriate given the accessibility of
the Internet.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the Internet is a relatively new medium
that is constantly expanding, flexible application
of the traditional notions of personal jurisdiction
is necessary to ensure that justice is served. Spe-
cifically, long-arm statutes and the requirements
of due process must be applied not with blinders,
but rather with a degree of creativity that enables
courts to properly evaluate whether they have per-
sonal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defend-
ant. To do so, the term "transaction of business"
must be applied with consistency and should only
include those activities which objective, reason-
able persons would expect it to include.
Despite the potential for widespread abuse,
courts must realize that extension of jurisdiction
will hinder the free flow of commerce and dis-
courage technological advancements. This is not
to suggest that improper contacts or tortious con-
141 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.
102 (1992).
142 See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301. Creating a site, like
placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt
nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without more, it is not
an act purposefully directed toward the forum state. See id.
(citations omitted).
143 See Byassee, supra note 8, at 211.
A remote transaction in the physical analogue of a cyber-
space transaction requires a person to place the material
duct should be tolerated. Parties should not be
free to commit tortious acts in cyberspace under
the claim that their behavior cannot be chal-
lenged in the home jurisdiction of the person
harmed. On the contrary, there should be a duty
of disclosure to inform computer users who inter-
act in cyberspace of the laws and customs to which
they are subject. For example, businesses should
have a duty of inquiry before entering into com-
mercial transactions over the Internet, and should
stipulate as to what law governs.
Finally, courts must realize that the posting of a
web page is not "purposeful availment," and that
mere accessibility in the forum state without more
should not constitute the requisite nexus between
the harmful behavior complained of and the re-
sultant injury. Courts must be wary that if they as-
sert their jurisdiction over transactions which
arise in cyberspace, they are arguably threatening
to subject all Internet users to their jurisdiction.
There is the risk that the unsettled nature of
cyberspace law will cause businesses and educa-
tional instituions to refrain from using the In-
ternet and, as a result, stifle the ability of the In-
ternet to prosper as an effective method of
communication. The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York has set forth
the seminal approach by applying current legal
standards in a clear and consistent manner. The
Court has addressed the issues associated with the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Internet
users and has set forth precedent that is likely to
ensure a smooth transition into the cyberspace
era.
at issue physically into the stream of commerce. A cyber-
space transaction dispenses with this requirement. From
thousands of miles away, the customer may simply reach
out and complete the transaction herself. The transpor-
tation is entirely self-service.
Id.
144 See Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 117 (suggesting that as
long as the defendant has knowledge that the product is mar-
keted in the forum, "the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot
come as a surprise.").
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